Ránki György (szerk.): Hungarian history, world history - Indiana University studies on Hungary 1. (Budapest, 1984)
Joseph Held: The Defense of Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade) in 1456: A Discussion of Controversial Issues
paganda purposes. If a gigantic army was unsuccessful, the valor and prestige of its opponent would be greatly enhanced, and this was not missed by the antagonists in question. There can be no doubt that the Ottoman army arrived at Belgrade in full strength. Preparations for the campaign began already in the fall of 1455. The call for troops went out to all parts of the Ottoman Empire, and the various contingents were assembled on the plains between Constantinople (by then Istambul) and Edirne. However, when the army began to move in the early summer of 1456, it did not march in one large mass. The troops were divided into two major and possibly several smaller groups. In Franz Babinger's phrase, they "gradually moved from the south towards Belgrade in dense swarms." Since no opposition was expected from the peoples in the Balkans, the Ottoman groups did not have to be concentrated and could, thus, follow different routes. Western estimates of the Ottoman army varied from 150,000 to 400,000 soldiers.4 But it seems that even the lowest number may have been too high. Professor Norman Tobias discussed this issue in a lecture delivered in May, 1980, at the 16th Annual Conference of Medieval Studies at Kalamazoo, Michigan, and he was kind enough to let me peruse his manuscript. Although his study examined the movement of Arab armies before the first siege of Constantinople in the early eighth century, his findings are relevant for most armies in the pre-industrial age. » According to his findings, the maximum number of soldiers who could march into battle in the southern fringes of Europe could not exceed 60-70,000. This was not so much the consequence of limitations on the provisions that an army could carry along its route of march, or acquire through purchases or requisitioning from the population it encountered, though all these had to be considered. The major problem was finding enough drinking water for the men and the animals. Thus, the movement of armies of even that size had to be planned to follow the course of rivers or larger streams where their drinking water could be secured. This was a task for which the answer in the Balkans would have been the Danube River. But to follow the river would have meant, for Mehemed II, a long detour and a waste of precious time. 14