Kubinyi András: Nándorfehérvártól Mohácsig. A Mátyás- és a Jagelló-kor hadtörténete - A Hadtörténeti Intézet és Múzeum Könyvtára (Budapest, 2007)
Hadtörténeti áttekintések
events in Hungarian history that are being mentioned by as many sources as Hunyadi’s triumph. In spite of that, several questions concerning the siege remain unanswered and political aspects have often influenced its evaluation, too. One of the questions is why did Sultan Suleiman I manage to take Hungary’s most important border castle 65 years after the defeat of his grandfather, the Ottoman sultan, outside the walls of Nándorfehérvár. The fall of the mediaeval Hungarian state in 1526 at Mohács was partly a consequence of the loss of Nándorfehérvár to the Ottomans in 1521. Among the issues regarding the victory at Nándorfehérvár, the first one concerns the strength of the opposing armies. According to the my calculations, the garrison under the command of Mihály Szilágyi and János Geszti inside the castle of Nándorfehérvár did not number more than 2000. Hunyadi’s troops can be estimated at less than 10000, while the strength of the crusaders is put between 20-30000 people by the special literature, which is exaggerated in my opinion. Concerning the number of the Ottoman troops, I accept the conservative estimate of 60-70000 people. I discussed another issue, to say the evaluation of the crusade, i.e. the military significance of the peasant crusaders. Among the Hungarian crusaders of St. John of Capestrano, there were warriors properly equipped with crossbows and harquebus, as well as men armed with cudgels, swords and bows only. This must have been the reason why Hunyadi did not let the crusaders intervene at the start. Despite the above, it was the action of this mixed crowd that eventually led to victory. After withstanding the long siege, it was the attack launched against the exhausted Ottoman troops that caused confusion in the enemy’s camp. It reveals the military talent of the Hungarian commander-in-chief that he realized the opportunity in time and led his troops to victory in the end. Thus, the triumph at Nándorfehérvár is owed to both Hunyadi and the crusaders led by St. John of Capestrano. In the study, I also deal with the issues of organization and supply, which prevented the continuation of the war, and I examine the evaluation of János Hunyadi. In Hungarian public opinion and historiography, Hunyadi had been considered an outstandingly positive character of Hungarian history from the middle of the 15th century, both as a soldier and a politician. Recent historical works, however, seem to present a somewhat more negative view of him. In my opinion, Hunyadi’s campaigns prove that he was a talented and great commander. Nevertheless, when fighting against the Ottoman Empire, which was much weaker at that time than half a century later, he only succeeded when he did not have to confront the entire Ottoman army, i.e. between October and March. As a result of the rather chance victory at Nándorfehérvár, however, the Ottomans did not directly attack Hungary for a long time. King Matthias followed his father’s example and instead of launching offensives, he strived to complete the system of border castles. As for the negative consequences of the siege of Nándorfehérvár, the failure of the western crusaders put a stop to the coming of foreign volunteers to Hungary, but that was not Hunyadi’s responsibility. (In the meantime the article came out in the Hadtörténelmi Közlemények.) The other new essay (Supplementary information to the disciplinary methods applied in King Matthias ’Army and the royal captain s scope of responsibility) puts up a few questions based on a few instruments that have been known for more than two hundred years, yet insufficiently exploited. King Matthias’ four letters from 1480 have been pre-305